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CLAYTON ACT PROCEEDINGS

CLAYTON ACT QUANTITY LIMIT PROCEEDINGS
ALAN BUXTON HOBBES*

In spite of its broad powers over commercial practices under the
Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Acts,' the formal regulatory
work of the Federal Trade Commission was, until 1949, confined to
a quasi-judicial process of deciding individual cases of violations of
those statutes. The practical effect of the accumulation of rulings
over three decades is much the same as that of quasi-legislative rulemaking, to be sure, in that general principles can be deduced from
the body of Federal Trade Commission decisions and stated almost
as a precise code. 2 This has been done in the Code of Federal Regulations. 3 Yet such "principles of decision," though having an authoritative and statutory ring to them, are technically not administrative
rules. The commission's complaints, therefore, do not allege that the
respondent has violated a particular rule promulgated by the commission. Rather they charge that he has committed certain acts which
are "unfair methods of competition" or "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices" in interstate commerce, within the meaning of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 4 or which constitute a violation of one or
more of the sections of the Clayton Act administered by the commission.5 Thus the commission's work differs in form from that of certain
other agencies which are required by their statutes to formulate rules.6
The Robinson-Patman Act, 7 which amended the Clayton Act in
*Attorney on the staff of the Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.
The views herein expressed are the writer's own and do not constitute an expression of the policy of the Federal Trade Commission.
238 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 41 (1946), as amended, 52 Stat. 111 (1938),
15 U. S. C. § 44 (1946); 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 12 (1946), as amended,
49 Stat. 1526 (1936),

15

U. S. C. § 12-26 (1946).

For the quasi-legislative function of the Federal Trade Commission see
Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Co., 283 U. S. 643, 51 S. Ct. 587, 75 L. ed.
1324 (1931); Rathbun v. United States, 295 U. S. 6o2, 55 S. Ct. 869, 79 L. ed. 1611
(1935); Sears Roebuck v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A.
7 th,

1919).

316 Code Fed. Regs. c. 1 (1938).
'Sec. 5; 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U. S. C. § 45 (1946)'Secs. 2, 3, 7; 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13; 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15

U. S. C. § § 14, i8 (1946).

OSee 21 and 27 Code Fed. Regs., setting forth the elaborate rules formulated by
the Food and Drug Administration of the Federal Security Agency and by the
Alcohol Tax Unit of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Treasury Department, with
regard to standards, quality, and labeling.
749 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1946).
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1936, conferred upon the Federal Trade Commission a new kind of
power, the authority to make substantive rules setting quantity limits
for commodity price differentials under specified conditions. The
power is narrow in the scope of its application but sufficiently deep
within that limited scope to have raised, as will be seen shortly, some
vexing problems within the first few months of its attempted exercise.
It was not invoked for some thirteen years, until September 28, 1949,
when the commission gave notice that it would conduct a hearing on
the establishment of quantity limits for replacement rubber tires.8
The Clayton Act prescribes no procedure for the establishment
of quantity limits, beyond requiring "due investigation and hearing
to all interested parties," 9 and it was to the Administrative Procedure
Act of 194610 that the commission looked for a pattern of procedure
that would satisfy prevailing ideas of administrative propriety.

Problems Presented
At least three questions of administrative law1 are posed by this
tentative venture of the Federal Trade Commission into the field of
substantive rule-making:
i. Does the procedure adopted meet all requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act?
2. At what stage in a quantity limit proceeding will affected
parties be deemed to have exhausted their administrative remedy for
the purpose of obtaining judicial review?
3- Can judicial review, when obtained, include an examination
of the economic data and conclusions underlying the limits that the
commission has imposed?
Nature and Purpose of Quantity Limits
Some familiarity with the concept of quantity limits and the
purpose they serve is essential to an analysis of the problems raised.
Section 2 of the original Clayton Act of 191412 forbade price discrimination between different purchasers of commodities, where such
discrimination might substantially lessen competition or tend to
'Fed. Reg., October 4, 1949.
'Sec. 2(a); 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) (1946).
106o Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U. S. C. § § 1001-1011 (1946).
"Apart from the administrative law aspects, there is a basic constitutional
question of the power of Congress to control the price structure of industries not
declared to be affected with a public interest, without the justification of economic
depression, war, or other national catastrophe.
-38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 13(a) (1946).
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create a monopoly in any line of commerce. That prohibition was
limited by a proviso permitting, among other things, discrimination
on account of differences in the quantity of the commodity sold.
The commission's proceeding against the Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Company in 193513 shows the kind of abuse which quantity
limits were designed to rectify and illustrates, too, the commission's
difficulties under the language of the original Clayton Act. The tire
company was charged with price discrimination on the following set
of facts: 14
From 1926 to 1933 Goodyear had maintained an arrangement with
Sears Roebuck and Company whereby it provided Sears with all of
the latter's tire requirements, the tires thus sold being advertised and
marketed by Sears under its own brand names and through its own
retail outlets. Throughout the period of the agreement, 19,ooo,ooo tires

were furnished to Sears, with Goodyear realizing thereon a net profit
of about $7,7oo,ooo. In the same eight years Goodyear earned a net
profit of about $2o,4oo,ooo on its direct sales of equal volume to other
retail outlets. The difference of about $12,7oo,ooo was found by the
commission to represent a price discrimination to the injury of
Goodyear's retailer-customers other than Sears, for the reason that
the difference in net return to the tire company was not, according
to the company's own accounting methods, explained by savings in
the cost of transportation and selling. The commission, while recognizing that quantity discriminations should be permitted to some
extent, when they involve an actual economic utility worthy of preservation, held that the quantity exception of the proviso in the Clayton
Act permitted, not unrestrained price discriminations under the
guise of discounts for greater quantities, but only those differentials
having a reasonable relation to differences in cost.
The commission recognized further that quantity sales may be
more economical than small ones, but it condemned the principle of
quantity discounts based on annual sales unless there was a demonstrable cost justification for them. Otherwise, the commission reasoned,
a large manufacturer might, by disposing of its whole output to a
single dealer or a few, set into motion a trend toward monopoly or
"22 F. T. C. 232.

uSince this article does not undertake to discuss the merits of quantity limits,
or to refute the plausible arguments which can be marshaled against the imposition
of such limits in a particular industry, the statement of facts given here is necessarily
sketchy. It is intended merely as an illustration-for those who may be unfamiliar
with the concept of quantity limits in trade regulation-of the general evil against
which Congress acted in adopting the quantity-limits proviso of the RobinsonPatman Act.
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achieve an unreasonable restraint of trade-evils for the correction
of which the Clayton Act was enacted. In due course the commission
issued its order to cease and desist.
Upon judicial review, the commission's order was set aside, 15 the
court holding that Section 2 of the Clayton Act did not empower the
commission to forbid price discrimination on account of quantity,
even when the discrimination did not reflect differences in cost, and
indeed there was no such explicit provision in the original statute.
Meanwhile, the commission had recommended to Congress, with
other suggested modifications, a change to repair the deficiency in
the language of Section 2, declaring:
That unless the price discrimination permitted "on account
of quantity" shall make "only due allowance" therefor, Section
2 of the Clayton Act may be readily evaded by making a small
difference in quantity the occasion for a large difference in
price. If the section is to have any vitality it must either be
interpreted and enforced to that effect or it should be amended
to that effect.' 6
A number of bills proposing changes in Section 2 of the Clayton
Act, to this and other purposes, received final expression in the
Robinson-Patman Act, approved June 19, 1936. That statute changed
the original provision respecting quantity limits so as to reach discriminations based on volume of purchase, where the result would be
the destruction of small traders, however efficient, to the 6ompetitive
advantage of their huge-though not necessarily more efficient-rivals.
The amended Section 2 prohibits price discrimination. In the
case of discriminations based on quantities, however, it allows an
absolute defense, to be made out by a showing that the discrimination
merely reflects differences in cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
resulting from the differing quantities sold or delivered.
From this amendment curing the defect of the original Clayton
Act with respect to discriminations based on quantity, the commission drew new vigor for its regulation of discriminatory pricing
methods. Numerous orders to cease and desist from unjustifiable
quantity discounts were issued, and one of these successfully withstood a test in the Supreme Court of the United States. 17 In that
'The Goodyear Tire 8: Rubber Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, soi
F. (2d) 62o (C. C. A. 6th, 1938), certiorari denied, Bo8 U. S. 557, 6o S. Ct. 74, 84
L. ed. 468 (1939).
IGSen. Doc. 4, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1936).
17
-Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 68 S. Ct. 822,
92 L. ed. 1196 (1948), reversing Morton Salt Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,
162 F. (2d) 949 (C. C. A. 7th, 1947).
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case, the Court reviewed the legislative history of the RobinsonPatman Act and held that discounts in the wholesale prices of packaged salt, unjustified by related savings in the cost of manufacture
or distribution, for quantities so great that only five national grocery
chains could qualify for them, were clearly of the evil at which the
amendment was directed.
It is settled law, therefore, that the Federal Trade Commission
may order the cessation, in particular cases, of economically unjustifiable quantity discounts under Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, where
such discounts are, or are likely to be, harmful to competition in
interstate commerce. Cost justification remains, in theory, a defense
to a charge of this species of price discrimination,' 8 but it is significant
-perhaps of the imperfection of existing cost accounting technicthat there has been as yet no successful attempt by a respondent to a
commission proceeding to demonstrate factually that his quantity discounts are a consequence of actual economies in his methods of sale
or distribution.
The commission's power with reference to quantity limits does
not, however, stop at the ordinary adversary proceeding to determine
whether some individual has violated Section 2(a) of the Act. Long
in disuse,' the "proviso to the proviso" in Section 2(a) received its
first breath of life in 1949 when the commission, conformably to the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, amended its Rules of Practice
and its General Procedures to include therein a Procedure for Establishing Quantity Limits. 19
Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act deserves patient reading. Briefly
considered in its application to quantity limits, the section forbids
price discrimination in specified circumstances but provides in the
first proviso a defense by cost justification. That is followed by a
second proviso:
Provided, however, That the Federal Trade Commission
may, after due investigation and hearing to all interested
parties, fix and establish quantity limits, and revise the same
as it finds necessary, as to particularcommodities or classes of
commodities, where it finds that available purchasers in greater
quantities are so few as to render differentials on account
thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in
2"Such discounts, like all others, can be justified by a seller who proves that
the full amount of the discount is based on his actual savings in cost. The trouble
with this phase of respondent's case is that it has thus far failed to make such
proof." Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U. S. 37, 48, 68 S. Ct.
822, 829, 92 L. ed. 1196, 12o5 (1948).

"s6 Code Fed. Regs., c.

1,

Pts. 2 and 7 (1938); Fed. Reg., Jan. 14, 1949.
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any line of commerce; and the foregoing [the defense of cost
justification] shall then not be construed to permit differentials
based on differences in quantities greater than those so fixed
and established. (Italics supplied.)
By cloaking the commission with the power to regulate quantity
discounts as to "commodities or classes of commodities" the Congress
has effectively delegated a quasi-legislative power to the commission,
which consequently is not limited to a case-by-case method of correction when it acts to eliminate an industry-wide abuse in quantity
discounts.
As the second italicized portion in the proviso quoted above indicates, the defense of cost justification, though still available to a
respondent in an ordinary adversary hearing on a complaint of price
discrimination, cannot be raised by a respondent to a complaint alleging violation of a quantity limit established by the Commission.
The drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act were quite willing that
provable cost justification, in the ordinary case of price discrimina20
tion, should be a complete defense. A previous version of the statute
had gone so far as to fix a definite maximum limit of one car lot,
beyond which price differentials should be illegal. The proponents
of this feature were inspired by precedents set in other adniinistrative
agencies. It had long been a practice of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to forbid rate differentials keyed to quantities exceeding
single carloads, 21 and the Grain Futures Act of 1922, as amended
in 1936,22 authorized the administrative fixing of limits in commodity trading.
Price differentials actually traceable to differences in cost to the
seller manifestly are only an apparent price "discrimination," for they
are free of the taint of unjust dealing. That they may, nevertheless,
present a genuine peril to competition, where only a handful of
purchasers can buy in the volumes necessary for receiving the most
favorable discount, was perceived years ago by the Interstate Commerce Commission when it held:
... to give greater consideration to trainload traffic than
to carload traffic would create preferences in favor of large
shippers and be to the prejudice of small shippers and the
23
public.
"'S. 3154, 7 4th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).'
"Rickards v. A. C. L. Ry., 23 I. C. C. 239 (1912); Ananconda Copper Mining
Co. v. C. & E. Ry., 19 I. C. C. 592 (191o); Planters Compress Co. v. Rys., ii I. C. C.
382, 402 (0o5); Providence Coal Co. v. Providence & Western Ry., i I. C. C.
363 (1887).
-49 Stat. 1491 (1936), 7 U. S. C. § 6(a) (1946).
2Ananconda Copper Mining Co. v. C. & E. Ry., 19 I. C. C. 592 (1910).
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The Senate Committee Report on the proposal to add the quantity
limit proviso to the Clayton Act 24 commented:

This proviso is added by recommendation of your committee. It is designed to enable, when necessary, the determination of quantity limits as to various commodities, beyond which
quantity price differentials shall not be permitted, even though
supported by differences in cost. It rests upon the principle
that where even an admitted economy is of a character that is
possible only to a very few units of overshadowing size in a
particular trade or industry, it may become in their hands
nonetheless the food upon which monopoly feeds, a proboscis
through which it saps the lifeblood of its competitors; and that
in forbidding its use and foregoing its benefits, the public is
but paying a willing price for its freedom from monopoly
control. A similar limitation has been applied without challenge for nearly half a century in the field of transportation,
in refusing to
extend freight rate differentials beyond the car
25
lot quantity.
Hence the quantity limit proviso, considered along with its
legislative history, constitutes a legislative declaration that in the
case of certain commodities price differentials based on quantities
may be an evil tending to monopoly. These commodities are in no
way enumerated by the statute, which, instead, authorizes the Federal
Trade Commission to discover them and to establish corrective limits.
Under the quantity limits proviso, the commission has the whole
and highly variegated field of interstate commerce in which to wield
its authority. The power is discretionary: the commission may defer
its exercise, as it has done for thirteen years; it may move to set limits
for a single commodity, as it has done in the past year; or it may
conceivably take upon itself the ambitious task of fixing limits for
numerous commodities.
At any rate, Congress has prescribed a remedial procedure for an
evil that it has condemned and described in abstract terms, leaving
it to an administrative vicar to determine the location and extent of
the evil, and to apply the remedy.
Adoption of the Quantity Limit Procedure
After passage of the Robinson-Patman Act amending the Clayton
Act, many independent tire dealers continued to complain to the
commission that the higher prices charged them by the tire manu-'Sen. Rep.

1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
2The quoted extract is also noteworthy as evidence that the quantity limits
proviso was aimed at industrial bigness per se.
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facturers were driving them out of business. Some of these grievances
were presented to the Small Business Committee of the House of
Representatives, which thereupon recommended that the Federal
Trade Commission and the Department of Justice take appropriate
action, failing which, strengthening amendments to the anti-trust
2
laws would be urged. 6
On July 7, 1947, the Federal Trade Commission took a preliminary
step toward the fixing of quantity limits for replacement rubber tires
by adopting a resolution that the rubber tire industry be investigated
to determine whether quantity limits should be established for that
commodity. Within the ensuing year, after study of the data which
it had obtained, it decided that conditions in the rubber tire
industry did in fact warrant a proceeding under the quantity limits
proviso. Simple as such an action might have been in the contemplation of the authors of the proviso, twelve years earlier, the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 was now a reality obliging the commission to devise a procedure that would in every way conform to
that new expression of desirable standards of administrative action.
The Administrative Procedure Act 27 clearly distinguishes the
two main administrative functions, rule-making and adjudication,
requiring on the whole fewer safeguards of "due process" in the
rule-making process than in adjudication. The Act recognizes
that certain kinds of rule-making demand the formal minimum safeguards of adjudication: hearing under a presiding officer; casting of
burden of proof on the proponent of the rule; opportunity to all
interested persons to present oral or documentary evidence, to submit
rebuttal evidence and to cross-examine; preparation of transcript of
testimony, exhibits, and pleadings as exclusive basis for final action,
etc. 28 On the other hand, the Act prescribes far less stringent requirements for the more general case of rule-making: notice of the proposed action in the Federal Register; opportunity to interested
persons to present their views in writing, though not necessarily to
present the same orally; full consideration to be accorded by
the agency to all relevant matters presented in its formulation of the
rules; and incorporation in such rules of a brief general statement
of their basis and purpose. 29
2
GAnnual Report No. i, Reporting Activities of the Select Committee on Small
Business, House of Representatives, Pursuant to House Resolution 18, 8oth Cong.,
1st Sess. (1947) 5.
16o Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U. S. C. § § 1oo1-1o1 (1946).
'Secs. 2 (c, d), 4, 5, 7, 8; 6o Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U. S. C. § § 1oo1 (c, d), 1oo3,
1004, 1oo6 and 1007 (1946).
-Sec. 4 (a,b); 6o Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U. S. C. § ioon (a, b) (1946).
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Summary of the Procedure Adopted

The Federal Trade Commission's Procedure for Establishing
Quantity Limits30 provides that proceedings for formulating a quantity
limit rule may be initiated either by the commission on its own
motion or by the motion of interested parties (paragraph (a)). At
any time an interested party may request or petition for establishment of a quantity limit rule for any commodity or class of commodity,
or for revision or repeal of a previously fixed rule, stating his interest
and setting forth relevant facts (paragraph (b)). In its discretion the
commission may thereupon conduct a non-public investigation to obtain information about existing quantity differentials and the competitive conditions prevailing in the industry in question. Data elicited in
the course of the investigation are not to be disclosed except in composite form so as not to reveal business secrets (paragraph (c)). The
commission's full powers of subpoena and requirement of special
reports from corporations under its organic statute are invoked by
the Procedure, with rights preserved to witnesses to retain copies of
documents produced and transcript of testimony given (paragraph (c)
(1, 2)), and to be accompanied and advised by counsel (paragraph
(c) (3).
If the commission is convinced by the facts thus discovered that
"available purchasers in greater quantities are so few as to render
differentials on account thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive
of monopoly" 3 lin the line of commerce under investigation, it is then
to draft a proposed quantity-limit rule (paragraph (d) (1)) for publication in the Federal Register and to be otherwise made available
to interested persons. Notice of the proposed rule is to include the
rule, amendment, or repeal proposed, the purpose to be accomplished,
the authority under which the rule is proposed, and the ultimate facts
supporting the rule (paragraph (d) (2)).
Interested persons may present views, data, and argument in writing and request time for oral argument. Oral argument is permitted,
however, only in the commission's discretion (paragraph (d) (3)).
After considering the results of its investigation and the views
presented by interested persons, the commission will, if it deems such
action necessary, promulgate a quantity-limit rule, to be published
in the Federal Register and to become effective no sooner than thirty
days after publication (paragraph (e)).
106 Code Fed. Regs. Ga, Pt. 2, § 2.30 (1938); Federal Trade Commission Rules
of Practice, Rule XXX.
"The language of the quantity limits proviso, Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act,
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. § 13 (1946).
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Amendment or repeal of a quantity limit rule is accomplished by
the same procedure as that prescribed for formulating new rules (paragraph (f)).
Enforcement of quantity limits follows the commission's usual
procedure of investigation, issuance of complaint, hearings, argument,
deliberation, and issuance of an order to cease and desist (paragraph (g)).
Comment on the Procedure
It will be readily seen that the procedure summarized above fully
meets the succinct requirements of the quantity-limit proviso of Section
2(a) of the Clayton Act. How far it fulfills the demands of the Administrative Procedure Act is a question calling for a more detailed
consideration.
Section 2(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act defines "rulemaking" as
...agency process for the formulation, amendment, or
repeal of a rule,
and "rule" as
...the whole or any part of any agency statement of general
or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe the
organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency,
including
...the approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages,

corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof,
prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or
of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any
of the foregoing. (Italics supplied.)
Quantity limit rules are clearly an "agency statement of general
or particular applicability and future effect, designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law," which includes "the approval or prescription for the future of ...prices.

..

or practices bearing" thereon. Con-

sequently it was concluded by the drafters of the procedure that any
proceeding to fix quantity limits would constitute a "rule-making,"
within the intent of Section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act.
Section 4 (b) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides two
alternative procedures for substantive rule-making, the choice of
which is governed by the statute under which the rule is to be made.
One of these is an "informal" process, whereby opportunity is afforded
to interested persons to participate by submitting "written data, views
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or arguments, with or without opportunity to present the same orally
in any manner," the agency to consider all relevant data thus presented and to incorporate in any rules adopted "a concise general
statement of their basis and purpose." This informal process was
intended to provide an administrative analogue to the Congressional
hearing, as Representative Walter intimated in his presentation of
32
the committee report on the Administrative Procedure Bill.

The second, and stricter, method of administrative rule-making,
which might be termed the "formal" process, is prescribed-also in
Section 4(b)-for cases in which the statute authorizing the rule requires that the rule be made "on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing." Where a formal proceeding is thus indicated, a
characteristically quasi-judicial procedure is to be observed, in compliance with the provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of the Act.
The drafters of the quantity limit procedure believed that the
fixing of quantity limits was essentially an "informal" rule-making
for the following reasons:
i. Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, though prescribing a "hearing"
as a necessary preliminary to the fixing of quantity limits, does not
require such a hearing to be "on the record," and therefore does not,
within the language of Section 4 (b) of the Administrative Procedure
Act, call for the formal hearing described in Sections 7 and 8. Furthermore, the legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act
would indicate that the formal method of rule-making was intended
only where the basic statute clearly contemplates, by its terms, a quasijudicial proceeding. In this regard, it was recalled that an earlier
measure to codify administrative procedure, introduced in 1941,33
had provided that "where legislation specifically requires the holding
of hearings prior to the making of rules, formal rule-making hearings
shall be held." That provision was adversely criticized by a Department of Agriculture spokesman who testified on the bill, for the
reason that various existing acts providing for hearings included
such a requirement simply for the purpose of allowing interested
parties to express their views, while the formal process, where actually
intended, was explicitly described, as in the case of formal rule-making
under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. 34
2. In 1945, the Secretary of Agriculture, in reporting to Congress
on the final version of the proposed Administrative Procedure Act,
292 Cong. Rec. 5648, 5650 (May 24, 1946).
2S. 674, 77th Cong., ist Sess. (1941).
",Senate Hearings on S. 674, 7 7 th Cong., ist Sess. (1941) pp. 79-81, 1515, 1520.
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commented that subsection (b) of Section 4 was no longer objectionable, since it had been redrafted to relax application of the procedural
requirements of Sections 7 and 8 (providing for a formal rule-making
process) in cases where though a hearing is required by statute the
agency is not limited to the hearing record in making its final determination.3 5 Presumably the Congress concurred in this view, for the
subsection underwent no further change.
3. The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act lends
further support to the view that a formal adversary is not a prerequisite
to the establishment of quantity limits. In 1936 Representative Utterback proposed an amendment which was not adopted.3 6 That amendment would have added to the quantity limit proviso the language
italicized below:
... the Federal Trade Commission, after due investigation
and hearing to all interested parties, following insofar as applicable the procedure and subject to the recourse of the courts
provided in section ri of this act, may issue an order fixing
and establishing quantity limits ....
Rejection of the proposed amendment was interpreted to show Congressional disapproval of formal hearings in the establishment of
quantity limits.
Opposition to the Procedure
Members of the rubber tire industry who would be placed at a
disadvantage by quantity limits on price brackets in their sales of
rubber tires have consistently opposed the adoption of an informal
procedure, arguing that quantity limits partake of the nature of rates,
which the Supreme Court has decided37 can be set only after a fulldress adversary hearing. In support of the commission's final decision
to draft an informal procedure stands the Yakus decision of the
Supreme Court 8 which distinguishes between public utility ratemaking, to which an adversary hearing is essential, and the fixing
of maximum prices to be charged in wartime by merchants who
are legally free to select their customers and even to refuse to sell
at all. It was concluded by the Court that an informal hearing would
afford due process of law in the latter case.
ZExcerpt of Secretary of Agriculture's Report to Chairman of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, quoted in Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, Office of the Solicitor, Department of Agriculture (mimeographed, no
date) at p. 49.
'6H. R. Rep. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
rInterstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 227
U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 L. ed. 431 (1912).

"Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 66o, 88 L. ed. 834 (1944).
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Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act expressly reserves to businessmen
the right to select customers.3 9 It would therefore appear that the
fixing of quantity limits resembles more closely the setting of price
ceilings, which was the issue in the Yakus case, than the rates charged
by concerns affected with a public interest, which are obliged to
serve all comers.
Pursuant to its promulgated Procedure, the commission published on September 28, 1949, notice of a hearing on fixing limits
for replacement rubber tires. Appended thereto was a summary of
the economic data from which the commission had concluded that
40
such action was necessary.
On November 7, 1949, a large mail order and chain store house
filed a "motion for hearing,"41 with the four major tire manufacturers
soon following suit. This was no mere prayer for an opportunity to
present oral argument on the merits of quantity limits for tires, as
provided for in the promulgated Procedure. Rather it was a flat
challenge of the validity of that Procedure and a demand for a formal
adversary hearing as a matter of right.
After alleging the company's interest in the proceeding, the motion
argued on this wise:
i. The proposed rule would in substance be a cease-and-desist
order against the chain store operators and others similarly situated,
banning quantity discounts beyond certain limits. Hence a formal hearing is just as necessary as if the proceeding were being held under a
formal complaint, with the affected parties named as respondents.
2. Due process is denied in that the data in support of the proposed rule have not been fully disclosed to the affected parties, who
are thus deprived of opportunity to examine and cross-examine
and to rebut unfavorable testimony. Moreover, the chain store company has no chance to present its own witnesses or to subpoena witnesses and documents otherwise unavailable, which are necessary to
the company's defense that existing differentials in price are not promotive of monopoly.
3. Without a complete written record of evidence and proceedings as an exclusive basis for the limits ultimately to be adopted,
judicial review of whether the evidence considered by the commission
."...

nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods,

wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona
fide transactions and not in restraint of trade...."
"Federal Trade Commission File 2o3-i; Fed. Reg., October 4, 1949.
"The motion was filed by Montgomery Ward & Company, one of the main
beneficiaries of quantity discounts in rubber tires.
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supports the rule and whether the commission's findings are grounded
in the evidence, will be impossible.
The commission did not dignify with formal action what it apparently considered to be a procedural irregularity and denied the "motions" informally by letter.
Next, the protesting parties filed petitions on December 5, 1949,
and shortly thereafter, praying the commission to amend its rules to
provide a formal adversary hearing in quantity limit proceedings
that would include the procedural safeguards enumerated in Sections
7 and 8 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The commission denied
these petitions a few days later without assigning grounds for its action.
Court Attack on the Procedure
On December 29, 1949, came the first collateral challenge to the
commission's authority to fix quantity limits under its promulgated
procedure. The tire manufacturers which had unsuccessfully petitioned
42
for changes in the procedure brought actions in the district court.
Seizing upon the commission's denial of their petitions as a "final
action" reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act and alleging irreparable injury should they be obliged to acquiesce in the
instant proceeding before the commission, the companies sought:
i. A judgment declaring that in the fixing of quantity limits
the commission is subject to Sections 4, 7, and 8 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, i.e., that only the formal, adversary rule-making is
appropriate.
2. A permanent injunction against all further proceedings by
the commission under its existing Procedure and against the commission's further proceeding in the rubber-tire matter under the notice
of hearing issued pursuant to the challenged procedure.
3. An interlocutory injunction against any further proceedings
in the matter, pending trial on the merits.
The grounds supporting the prayer for this relief were substantially those urged in the petitions for the amendment of the Procedure.
Non-Reviewability of the Proceeding
It is hard to discover any reviewable "final action" in the proceedings to the present. No legally palpable injury has occurred, or
'-2The Goodyear Tire 8cRubber Co., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, United
tates District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action 5455-'49.
The commission's motion to dismiss plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction for want of jurisdiction has been sustained.
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can occur, from the mere promulgation of the Procedure for Establishment of Quantity Limits or from the initiation of any proceedings pursuant to its terms, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly
held that until administrative actions "impose an obligation, deny
a right, or fix some legal relationship as a consummation of the ad43
ministrative process," they are not reviewable.
Procedural irregularities are of course subject to judicial review
along with review of a final administrative action asserted to impose
a legal wrong on an affected party. 44 But only rarely-and then with
reluctance-have instances of such irregularities been reviewed by the
courts without clear statutory authorization for such interference. 45
It is equally questionable whether a declaratory judgment can be
properly rendered at this stage. The Supreme Court has recently held
that the declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief,
should be withheld in cases of contingent questions, particularly where
governmental action is involved, unless the need for equitable relief
46
is "clear, not remote or speculative."
Had the protesting companies awaited actual establishment of
quantity limits, there might then have been brought into being the type
of final action contemplated by the Administrative Procedure Act.
Yet even then it could be plausibly argued that since there is no
penalty for violation of quantity limits until the commission has
issued a formal cease-and-desist order after complaint and hearings,
no detriment could be suffered by the companies. Apprehensive though
"Chicago and Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333
U. S. io3, 68 S. Ct. 431, 92 L. ed. 568 (1948); Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United
States, 307 U. S. 125, 59 S. Ct. 754, 83 L. ed..ni47 (1939); United States v. Los
Angeles & S. L. R. Co., 273 U. S. 299, 47 S. Ct. 413, 7 L. ed. 651 (1927); United
,States v. Illinois Central R. Co., 244 U. S. 82, 37 S. Ct. 584, 61 L. ed. 1007 (1917).
"In re Electric Bond & Share Co., 73 F. Supp. 426 (S. D. N. Y. 1946); see also
Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 486, 56 S. Ct. 906, 8o L. ed. 1288 (1936).
"-"Where administration intention is expressed but has not come to fruition
(Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. s. 288 r56 S. Ct. 466, 8o L. ed.
688 (1936)1), or where that intention is unknown (Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
v. Grosjean, 3o U. S. 412, 429, 430 [57 S. Ct. 772, 81 L. ed. 1193 (1937)]), we have
held that the controversy is not yet ripe for equitable intervention...." Eccles
v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, 333 U. S. 426, 68 S. Ct. 641, 92 L. ed. 784
(1948). See also Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 58 S. Ct.
459, 82 L. ed. 638 (1938); Transamerica Corp. v. McCabe, So F. Supp. 704 (D. C.
D. C. 1948).
Even a preliminary order which has the effect of prohibiting or requiring
conduct by persons subject to its operation, provided that certain further administrative action is consummated, has been held not reviewable. East Ohio Co. v.
Federal Power Commission, 115 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o).
"Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, 333 U. S. 426, 68 S. Ct. 641,
92 L. ed. 784 (1948).
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these parties may be over the probable effect of quantity limits on
their future business dealings, it can scarcely be contended that
47
injury has occurred or is imminent.
There being adequate provision for the review of all matters
bearing on the rights of parties in Clayton Act proceedings, a collateral, non-statutory review in vacuo of the bare Procedure, before
that Procedure has received concrete application, would be both
premature and in derogation of the quasi-legislative power which
48
that Act delegates to the Federal Trade Commission.
Conclusion
In any consideration of the problem at hand it should be constantly
borne in mind that the quantity limits proviso in the Clayton Act is
skeleton legislation which can become effective law only through administrative implementation. That implementation must take the form
of agency rule-making, though not necessarily the form of an adversary
proceeding. In a sense, adverse interests are at stake in all legislation
but it is hardly to be suggested that the guarantee of due process
requires a legislative body, in its consideration of new laws, to treat
as litigants all who may be adversely affected. No more, then, should
administrative rule-making be limited to adversary proceedings for
its conduct, where they are not prescribed by statute and where adequate judicial review is provided in the statute occasioning the rulemaking to curb administrative zeal and misinterpretation. Due process
is fully afforded by granting, to interested members of the public,
the opportunity of participating by making known their views to
49
the rule-making body for its guidance.
The preliminary proceeding by which the Federal Trade Commission drafted its quantity limit procedure involved no particular
party; hence no judicial review can be had until a particular commodity or class of commodity has been regulated. Any defects in the
,""Obviously, the rule requiring exhaustion of the administrative remedy
cannot be circumvented by asserting that the charge on which the complaint rests
is groundless and that the new holding of the prescribed administrative hearing
would result in irreparable damage. Lawsuits often prove to have been groundless,
but no way has been discovered of relieving a defendant from the necessity of a
trial to establish the fact." Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41,
58 S. Ct. 459, 82 L. ed. 638 (1938).
"Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752, 67 S. Ct. 1493, 91 L. ed.
1796 (1947); Transamerica Corp. v. McCabe, 8o F. Supp. 704 (D. C. D. C. 1948).
"But there is no constitutional right to a hearing in a legislative or quasilegislative proceeding. See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U. S. 503, 64 S. Ct. 641, 88
L. ed. 892 (1944); Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F. (2d) 676 (C. A. 9th, 1949).
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intramural proceeding of the commission must await the judicial
review of a final action adversely affecting some person or persons
before they can be brought to the scrutiny of the courts. At that time,
any procedural shortcomings will be fully reviewable in an inquiry
of whether the commission has properly exercised its delegated authority. It would be highly impractical, however, for a court to undertake a premature examination of the due-process aspects of administrative rules until those rules have become operative and productive
of legal injury, and even then the aggrieved must first have exhausted
his administrative remedy.
The legislative history of the quantity limits proviso in Section
-(a) of the Clayton Act-far from indicating that a formal adversary
proceeding was intended-shows merely a Congressional concern that
the commission conduct a fair investigation of all pertinent data
before setting quantity limits, much as Congress itself would have
done had it undertaken to fix limits by statute. The commission's
Procedure, therefore, appears fully to satisfy the minimum requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act by providing an adequate
informal rule-making process in accordance with Section 4.
Judicial determination of the economic considerations of quantity
limits established by the commission is probably excluded by the
doctrine that the wisdom or expediency of legislation is not a matter
for judicial inquiry. Assuming the constitutionality of the quantity
limits, only the question of whether the commission has correctly
exercised the power delegated is open to review. 50
If the Federal Trade Commission should be obliged to conduct
quantity-limit proceedings with the same solemnity as at present
observed in its formal docket cases, it is doubtful whether the commission would find it practicable to seek further to exercise its quantitylimit powers, for then whatever advantage might be gained in eliminating cost justification as a defense would be offset by the sheer
unwieldiness of the proceedings. In formal rule-making hearings, a
far greater number of interested parties might be expected to appear
and to demand their right to present evidence, to rebut the commission's data, and to make protracted cross-examinations than would
ordinarily participate in a proceeding by formal complaint, where
cumulative and immaterial evidence could be more readily excluded.
Furthermore, quantity limits, once established, are not self-enforcing,
nNebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 56 S. Ct. 505, 78 L. ed. 940 (1934); United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 58 S. Ct. 778, 82 L. ed. 1234 (1938);
Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1, 43 S. Ct. 47o, 67 L. ed.
839 (1923).
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for they possess no sanctions beyond the issuance of a formal complaint
by the commission against a violator.5 ' If quantity limits should be
violated, therefore, there still would remain to be traveled the tortuous
road of investigation, complaint, hearing, testimony and cross-examination, interlocutory appeals, final argument, deliberation by the
commission, preparation of findings, issuance of an order to cease
and desist, and court affirmance, before steps could be taken to penalize
an offender.
That is not to say, however, that a broader opportunity might
not be accorded interested parties to make certain that their views,
data, and arguments will, in fact, receive the full consideration of
the rule-makers. Despite the apparent dichotomy of the Administrative Procedure Act in its provisions for the informal and formal types
of rule-making, there is nothing in that statute which would exclude
a procedure falling within the intermediate "gray zone" between
the full-dress adversary hearing and rule-making on the basis of
written submittals.
Interesting in this regard is a hearing procedure now employed
by the Department of Agriculture in the exercise of its powers to fix
limits in commodity trading.52 As promulgated, 53 that procedure
enables any interested party to request establishment, amendment
or rescission of a limit. Such a person does not acquire legal status
ipso facto, but he has the right to appear, to testify, and to file statements. Ten days' notice to all persons who would be affected by such
a limit-and an even shorter period in case of emergency-is provided,
with appropriate publication in the Federal Register. Hearings are
conducted by a presiding officer, "in such a way as to afford to interested persons a reasonable opportunity to be heard on matters relevant
to the issues involved and so as to obtain a clear and orderly record."
All concerned are given "reasonable opportunity" to offer pertinent
evidence, and the presiding officer is empowered to restrict the evidence according to relevancy but otherwise is not bound by the technical rules. Affidavits are admissible.
Particularly noteworthy is the latitude allowed in the Commodity
Trading Limits Procedure for questioning. Every witness is subject
to questioning by the presiding officer or other representative of the
department, who presumably may inquire as to points raised by any
5Orders issued under the Clayton Act, unlike those issued under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, do not become final until they have been judicially affirmed
(Section 12).

-'49 Stat. 1491 (1936), 7 U. S. C. § 6(a) (1946).
Code Fed. Regs., Part 0 (1938).
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of the interested parties, and even cross-examination by private parties
is permitted when expressly authorized by the presiding officer.
Testimony is reported verbatim, and supporting materials and
written argument are embodied in the record as numbered exhibits.
The presiding officer is not bound, however, to consider solely
the record in preparing his findings of fact, conclusions, and proposed final order.
The legality of this procedure has apparently not been tested in
the courts, but it is fairly safe to assume that it would fulfill even
the requirements of Sections 7 and 8 if liberally followed.
It can thus be seen that there is a middle ground between the
two extreme solutions proposed by the Federal Trade Commission,
on the one hand, and members of the tire industry, on the other.
Administrative agencies having become an indispensable part of our
political structure, they should take especial pains to avoid the appearance of acting by fiat, particularly in matters growing out of knotty
economic complexities. The parties against whom administrative
writs are to run have every right to be assured that their points of
view will be fairly and fully considered, and it is doubtful that a
system of written submittals and limited oral argument, without the
salutary cross-pollination of ideas achieved in the open forum, can
inspire the highest confidence in the final action.

